Wilhelm Hugo - Exilarchiv
Helmut Kohl: "...But You Need to Get to The Heart of It..."
III. Holmes and Watson at work
(It should be understood that the following analysis exclusively refers to Mr Kohl's original wording, which was in German.)
- "Kalifornien"
- The mentioning of "Hollywood" is surprising in connection with the mentioning of Goebbels and because of the interrelated term "PR".[ 6 ] However, Kohl puts "Kalifornien" in the first place. Now, Silicon Valley has nothing to do with PR. Only "Kalifornien" and "Hollywood" put together result in the associative connection "Reagan", whose political home was California and who started his career as an actor in Hollywood.
- "in Kalifornien"
- "In Hollywood" / "in Kalifornien" are turns of speech derived from phrases such as (was never) 'at the university' or (was never) 'in the country herself'. They refer to places where knowledge and skills are provided at first hand, where both, training and experience, above all practical experience are offered, in contrast to places offering purely theoretical knowledge not based on experience and practical insight. "Kalifornien" / "Hollywood" stand for 'Reagan' as synecdoches and feature him by highlighting his background. To this "Kalifornien" (Silicon Valley) associatively adds other elements such as 'absolutely leading', 'fond of experimentation', 'free enterprises' etc.
- "war nie"
- "War nie" ('was never') associates 'did not have the possibility', for instance for financial reasons. This implies social inferiority, however strong ambition ('although' someone was never there). Gorbachev obviously wants to become something, is representative of the rags-to-riches mentality. The phrase "war nie" ('was never') upgrades Gorbachev's efforts and his achievement through the preceding "aber" ('but was never ...').
- Material for comparison might be the idea of attending adult evening classes. Graduates of this kind are admired because of the odds against them. They are unconventional and command an overriding intelligence, that is successful, although they 'never' e.g. 'had a regular home'. However, the accentuation of the natural talent, which manages without school and is yet successful, is stronger.
- Material for comparison here would be (what fits in amazingly) the admiration for great actors, who (like Reagan?) never attended drama school. In this case, a behavior of the good, old days is implied, when all this was possible, compared to (the speaker's contempt of) the 'average' that today's schools produce. A certain disdain for schools is perceivable which pass top talents by, however also a nostalgic element of longing for a completely free formation of the person by absence of public government in times of need (as the postwar era). This fits Kohl's admiration of Gorbachev as a representative of a nation without polished prosperity syndrome. Kohl sympathizes with Gorbachev when he identifies with the latter's practical intelligence in times of need.
- "War nie" ('was never') - under the aspect of individual initiative, of the innovative, then expands the meaning of "Kalifornien" / "Hollywood" and draws the attention to something so far forgotten. The difference to Gorbachev's early form of the selfmademan concept lies in the present economic infrastructure of the USA (Silicon Valley) and in the identification of the nation as such with the concept, whereas Gorbachev (as representative of a still inflexible society and as an individual) wants to take the incredible risk of realizing the same script against the complete infrastructure of his own country. But it is also true, that Gorbachev, although he simply copies a role model, aims at something which in Hollywood lost its meaning long ago and is now only cinematically being recapitulated. Gorbachev, in contrast, thus appears to be an original 'settler', compared to the weakening legend of the American settler in Hollywood. Gorbachev - in Kohl's view - develops basically 'American' vigour, although he does this at a stage of development, which the USA have already left behind.
- In terms of education, "Kalifornien" / "Hollywood" would then be the 'grade' pursued by Gorbachev with a kind of vigour and with an ambition, that Americans themselves already lack. Gorbachev, in contrast to the Americans, is incalculable like a cowboy and might be able to achieve something spectacular as an individual ("aber versteht was von PR") ['but he understands something about PR']. In this respect he is a challenge or even a danger for the renown connected with "Kalifornien" / "Hollywood".
- But "war nie" ['was never] thus also retroactively upgrades California and Hollywood to 'leading institutions', where only top rank people teach and are taught. To put themselves in a favourable light graduates will later have just to mention that they 'studied at Prof. X. in Y'. On the other hand, this is exactly what Gorbachev is taking on without even having been 'there'. Associated are some personal features such as a person's will to try hard, to emulate, to observe, to study. Gorbachev's 'approach' is original, creative, innovative, quite incalculable, intelligent, shrewd.
- To sum up: "War nie, aber" ['was never ... but'] therefore signals the danger that Gorbachev might be able to quite outshine Hollywood / California. But here are two contrasts to be considered which overlap each other. Gorbachev's original vigour - as already determined above - reminds of the American cliches of the 'settler' or the 'cowboy', i.e. of precisely that attitude that the American frontier mentality of the early period was based on and which is now respesented by the - aging - actor Reagan. And as it was the case for the 'settlers' in the historical past of the USA, Gorbachev is now facing a land to be conquered: the inflexible Soviet Union. One achievement he has already accomplished: He is a "modern" communist leader, unlike his predecessors - "modern" corresponding to "Kalifornien" (Silicon Valley). While in the USA the concept of 'modernity' penetrates society as a whole, Gorbachev faces a society, that does not even know what to do with 'modernity'.
- A second contrast follows next to it. It is established by the contrast between Gorbachev's new start and the forming of the American society, performed a long time ago, a society, which now however and in ironic contrast identifies with the 'old Reagan'. If however Gorbachev's 'young' unconventional way is put against the 'well-trodden' American system, Gorbachev's new start may lead - if one does not watch out dreadfully - to the future 'replacement' of this system. This warning however implies Kohl's technical criticism of Reagan - and this may be decisive for the interpretation: Kohl apparently has in mind to warn Reagan not to be naive and further consider himself to be the 'greatest'. Of course, an element of showing-off is unmistakably there. Kohl is indeed condescending and indulgent in respect to Reagan's age, but he is too proud of the powerful friend to make even clearer reservations.
- With "Kalifornien" / "Hollywood", however, a 'something' is presupposed, something that one can learn there - in contrast to the rest of the world - to the point of perfection: PR. But Kohl is apparently quite anxious not to mention what 'PR' precisely is. But he is obviously certain, that insiders will immediately grasp what the term means, especially if the keyword 'Goebbels' is added. 'PR' therefore is surrounded by the aura of the mysterious for those, who are not in the know. For them 'PR' does not seem to be rationally accessible. More closely considered, the synecdoches "Kalifornien" / "Hollywood" turn out to betray Kohl's fascination of a secret knowledge 'among few statesmen of the world' (Kohl included).
- "Der Goebbels"
- Kohl's reference to Goebbels appears to be obscene. It hurts valid taboos: 'Goebbels' must not be mentioned in this manner outside of the historical context of the Third Reich. Attempts to use Goebbels in analogies of this kind - cf. 'The Greens = Goebbels / GDR = KZ (see Kohl) have been unsuccessful. The failure lay apparently in the strong tie of the name to the historical context, in the perception of the singular nature and the scale of the Nazi crimes and/or in the equation of Nazism with crime as such. 'Goebbels' is regarded as a metaphor for the unthinkable. With regard to the contents the name has taken on the form of a somewhat 'philosophical' term, which limits its instrumentalization.
- Kohl's mentioning of Goebbels appears surprising by the obvious absence of this traditional (associative) context, even relieving, 'easy going', but then obscene. An element of pleasure can not be denied. Kohl replaces the context, which one would expect, by colloquial formulations. Therefore, he takes from the name the aura of a 'pool', of a repository of 'high', here of superlative conceptions of crime.
- The definite article before 'Goebbels' in particular adds to this: Kohl says "der Goebbels" ['the Goebbels'] turning the addressed into a type. However, Kohl also creates in this way a strange compound of personal perspectives on Goebbels. On the one hand, some historical dissociating and a certain colloquial devaluation is at work. This is mediated via the accentuation of a bare function, (material for comparison would be: 'the caretaker') which however can equally be interpreted as revaluation ('the Pope'). However, the also colloquial component of intimacy ('the Smiths') is not less perceivable.
- "verstand was"
- "Verstand auch was von" [understood also something of'] is subdivisible. "Verstand was von" [understood something of'] is derived from 'to know one's business'. However, the German short form "was" (for "etwas" = something) takes the serious component from the image of the craftsman and guides it into the colloquial. Craft in this sense points to the category of the brilliant safe cracker, for example to a figure of a comedy thriller, to the English gentleman post robbers. The protagonists gain the spectators' admiration. Amusement clearly has a hand in this (a clever maverick against the stupid authorities), and there is an element of malignancy that power became outwitted. Fairly clear is the constellation of a coup of one against the rest of them, but there is also the drama of hitting back and of demonstrative cleverness of an underdog. Kohl's amusement is documented in the tape recording at this point: He laughs cooingly. This amusement signals identification and solidarity (against the superior opponent), as this can be read off from spectators' reactions in comedy thrillers.
- Important is that the new context, on the one hand, interprets crime as a (justified) counter, as self-defense, and that, on the other hand, the crime on principle only consists in the robbing of capital values, that physical power is not included, even less murder (compare the 'philosophy' of the English gentleman robbers). The new context (justified, 'noble' crime) in fact refers here to no one else but - Goebbels.
- "auch"
- "Auch" ['also'] amplifies the component of reacting, of 'answer'. 'Goebbels was certainly and definitely no fool': He saw things through, f.e. the opponent whom he then surprised with the coup. "Auch" ['also'] therefore signals intelligence and tactical cleverness. However, the combination with colloquial "was" ['something'] adds defiance again. This gains importance with respect to Kohl's communicative situation opposite an American interview partner. Kohl here confirms the 'new' interpretation he underlaid 'Goebbels', i.e. the component of defiance: He tends to solidarize with Goebbels in view of an American, as if this American looked down on Goebbels. On the other hand, Kohl follows a pedagogic impulse in the entire interview part (also according to the tape recording itself), as if he wanted to teach something to the American interview partner, who - as an US- American - will anyhow not grasp the message.
- Together with the component of defiance the phrase "auch was" ['also something'] results in the tenor of rehabilitation from the perspective of national continuity. Kohl wants to make it clear to his American counterpart that Goebbels mastered the said skill perfectly a long time before Reagan. Kohl proves himself to be an expert, a connoisseurs so to speak, who is able to resort to an 'old', i.e. his own history, unlike the American who is not in the position to do this.
- "verstand auch was"
- "Verstand auch was" ['also understood something'] then means latently 'already understood something'. This betrays condescension towards the American 'lack of history'. Old Europe is put against the 'young America'. The cliche of the 'German' invention - which was 'stolen' by the victors after the war and then declared American - is obvious, similar to what the Japanese were accused of in the field of industry in past decades. Goebbels would then be the 'past master', whose 'historical achievement' ("PR") in Kohl's view can not be allowed to be curtailed.
- Pedagogic impulse
- Some other elements of the text part support the reading, that Kohl might want to teach something to the American Nagorski, that he wants to make it clear to him, that he, Kohl, might have a better-founded background than his counterpart. This becomes especially delicate, as Kohl thereby maintains that Americans in actual fact do not understand the technique of "PR" correctly, although the mecca of the trainees is situated in California / Hollywood. As apparently even Reagan himself, Americans unfortunately handle PR too unconsciously and naively: They don't know the 'backgrounds'.
- Kohl's giggling (documented on the tape) seems to serve as encouragement and support of the learning process. As a matter of fact, the American Nagorski joins in to Kohl's laughter, if only in a somewhat forced way. Obviously however, Nagorski by this gesture seems to assure Kohl, that he indeed has learnt something: 'Oh, that is something, I have not yet known'. The American partner, so one must understand from Kohl's efforts, is one of those potential 'fools', one of the endangered people, he talks about elsewhere.
- Cultures
- If accordingly Americans look 'old' compared to Gorbachev and if Kohl considers his American interview partner to be a greenhorn, then one may deduce from this an array of cultural conditions. The most recent in experience and depth would be the Soviet culture, still caught up in paralysis that the 'young' Gorbachev attempts to break open. The next one would be Reagan's America that ('as always') savors everything to the full ("Hollywood"), forgets the outside world because of her childlike play instinct and therefore has no sensual capacity to locate the 'threat' in the guise of Gorbachev's PR. Americans may practise PR perfectly, they are, however, satisfied with the casual effect. The depth is missing, the historical dimension of an 'old' culture - and this is what Kohl supplies. In experience and depth, in powers of judgement - what concerns PR, neither Reagan nor Gorbachev come up to him, Kohl.
- Concept of history
- In Kohl's pedagogic gesture contained is also the consciousness, to be closer to the 'danger' (not to live "in Kalifornien" / "Hollywood" but in Germany), to know that danger from closer insight than his American interview partner. Since this partner (Nagorski) has certainly worked in Bonn long enough, Kohl's pedagogic air towards Nagorski must anyhow appear as offence. And this all the more, if it should conceal Kohl's ignorance of the fact, that Nagorski is not only regarded as an experienced Bonn correspondent of a worldwide renowned magazine but just so is a seasoned critic of the Soviet Union who is not in need of such lessons. [ 7 ]
- However, the effect must be worse if Kohl has knowledge of Nagorski's long professional commitment in Bonn. Then, indeed, Nagorski imparts only one thing to Kohl: An American can not learn what Kohl knows. Solely spatial proximity to the Soviet danger does not suffice. Something must be added, namely the coming to terms with historical experience for which alone Kohl stands. Being 'near' something then means the thinking in long periods, because long periods are characteristic of European history. By briefly mentioning 'Goebbels' Kohl thus demonstrates how sovereignly he masters the big lines of history, how smoothly he produces combinations in the briefest possible form.
- History is then presupposed as a limited number of typical phenomena. The ability to reduce a complex history to a few basic phenomena is put against another viewpoint which Kohl apparently senses in his counterpart (otherwise, no pedagogic effort would be necessary). The colloquial form in "verstand auch was" ['also understood something'] then is a demonstration that Kohl can easily handle 'big' things of history, that he doesn't allow them to impress him, that he denies any kind of historical singularity, and that he identifies historical simplicity. In this way, Kohl claims to follow an instructing and informing, a rationalist impulse.
- Material for comparison for history, as Kohl understands it, (long periods, simple principles), is the natural history with its principle of the 'coming and going'. Insofar, Kohl's concept of history originates from the positivism of the 19th century with its fascination of biologistic models of 'blossoms', a theory that was of lasting importance in the educational system of Germany up into the 60s of the 20th century. Constitutive for that view is the belief to be able, after all, to explain with a law of nature the 'downfall' of cultures (or eras) and the origin of cultures (e.g. of Rome, of the German classical period, of political-military power complexes and/or of their cultural implementation), combined with the biologistic definition of 'weak' and 'strong' nations.
- Leading interest is the instrumentalization of this knowledge in order to arrange or 'explain' a blossom power or blossom era or in order to manipulate the factors, that threaten to lead to the 'downfall'. It is equally a leading interest to act according to the 'law', to prove to history in which stage it might at present be. From this originates either the pathetic 'warning of the downfall' or the explication of the hard 'price for the blossom'. This concept of history is bound to arrive at the 'great leaders', the charismatic figures who read the 'signs' and who drive history forward, to 'survival' that is. The contradiction between 'law' and 'manipulation' is not recognized. The willingness to powerfully secure the 'survival' is already proof of a culture, which in this sense is a 'strong' one.
- Beyond that, Kohl's pedagogic effort clearly implies that he wants to convince others 'with enthusiasm'. Missionary eagerness in spreading his 'discoveries' is unmistakable. It is apparent that the biologistic history concept serves as the base of the mentioned evaluating array of cultures (Gorbachev-Reagan-Kohl). Therefore Kohl is interested in the factors which lead to 'downfalls' or 'blossoms'.
- The American counterpart obviously shows - and this provokes Kohl pedagogic emotion - the very 'weakness' that Kohl knows of coming down cultures that give themselves up because they are oblivious and rest on their laurels. To this the term "fools", that Kohl uses a second before, corresponds quite well. It is then also a sign of the 'weak' not to recognize the intention of the 'strong' to exploit this weakness. In this context one might well think of typical terms of the vocabulary of the biologistic philosophy of history, such as 'wimp', 'sickly', 'decadent', depicting the 'weak', or 'rampant', pointing at the fascinating but dangerous 'strong'.
- Crime
- Implied in the conception of a 'strong' culture is the price of big crimes and of mercilessness (material for comparison might be Napoleon, Charles the Great, Caesar etc.), the price of painful interventions and the recognition of such cultures despite of these crimes, which - put against the 'historical task' - appear to be necessary, inevitable, farsighted, great, and good. Typical for this kind of rhetorics is the figure of 'true - but': "True - Hitler murdered six million Jews, but he gave work to six million unemployed persons and he built the Autobahn." Or: "True - Charles the Great indeed organized a massacre among the Saxons but one should also think of the genius of his policy of framing the nation." Into this kind of history concept Kohl introduces Gorbachev as the 'leader of a strong culture', i.e. a culture gaining strength again.
- Kohl, too, will have been familiar with the fact that Goebbels was responsible for crimes. Otherwise, the mentioning of the name - in connection of a warning against Gorbachev - would make no sense. The formula of 'true - but' can help here, to re-discover the component of crime: 'Goebbels indeed committed crimes - but he understood something about PR'. The complement through a thought insertion is necessary for the following reason:
- It is tacitly implied in the warning against the interview partner's too favourable opinion about Gorbachev (cf. 'There have been clever rascals before'): Gorbachev might prove to be a new Goebbels, one that uses PR, in order to commit or hush up crimes. PR makes delusion possible. Therefore, caution is imperative in the case of Gorbachev. But taking into account Kohl's possible biologistic conception of history, this can not mean that Kohl warns against Gorbachev's crimes or that he wants to count crimes against him. Kohl just warns against the fact that Gorbachev will possibly soon be master in an art which is totally legitimate among all 'great' statesmen and that Gorbachev may well be better in this art than all the others.
- De-historicizing 'PR'
- In addition, to relate 'PR' to Goebbels is part of Kohl's intention to demonstrate his ability of brilliantly simplifying complex historical courses of events. Tenor: 'Why bombastically talk about propaganda, that was nothing but PR'. Or: 'There is nothing new in it.' Kohl robs the historical complex in question its singular nature. This to Kohl seems to be his central pedagogic coup. PR is not tied to persons and eras but is one of those few, simple elements history is made from. Because - history is made by people and if they are 'great' people, they have always the same nature.
- Therefore, Kohl does not make the least attempt, to distinguish between Goebbels' "PR', Gorbachev's PR and Hollywood's PR. On the contrary it is the quality common to all three that seems to be at Kohl's heart. However, this quality becomes exclusively conceivable by Kohl's expressly mentioning Goebbels for elucidation. This common quality then is: 'crime'. Accordingly PR is to be defined in a de-historicized manner as a means of strong cultures (leaders / power complexes) to prepare or conceal necessary moral detours or deviations of 'great' politics, no matter if used by Goebbels, by Hollywood/California (Reagan), by Gorbachev, or - by Kohl.
- The fact, that Kohl separates neither Goebbels nor the latter's 'PR' semantically from Reagan's or Gorbachev's practice is also important in respect to the pragmatics of the speech situation: Kohl is apparently in full swing. On the original tape he seems incited and fired by the simultaneous translation of the interpreter in the background to set a further highlight according to every short intervention of the translator. But while Kohl in this way wants to argumentively work on and impress the American counterpart he has manoeuvred himself to the point of saying something that he might have never questioned privately but that he has apparently not yet uttered publicly - one of the brilliant 'combinations' that Kohl discovers in the entire printed interview: Exactly now Kohl falls into stuttering and is suddenly faced by an unpleasant backlog in relation to the interventions of the translator.
- Only with the third run and definitely also under the stress of the speech situation Kohl's decides, not only to mention "California" and "Hollywood" shortly together but just so to mention Goebbels immediately afterwards and to complete the whole by the final switch: Already relieved Kohl interupts the attending Foreign Office translator's intervention with the added sentence "Man muss doch ..." ['One must ...']. It is a self-encouragement ('Damn it altogether! That's the way it is!'). Kohl evaluates the truth content of his sudden inspiration apparently very high. He indeed knows its explosiveness, however decides to use 'plain language' at last. He skips over possible doubts and a due reflection and fills the gap by help of an especially loud 'stroke onto the table'. However this audibly remains a moment of shock for him because what would have to be a matter of re-thinking and of explication excites him, maybe, because it contains the very nature of 'greatness'. Therefore, he leaves it at symbolic keywords.
- "modern"
- The conception of crime that Kohl associates with PR is in obvious contrast to the 'great' figures of history who did not conceal their crimes, as the scattered public knowledge of these crimes included no danger for the power of these great figures. Kohl names some of these figures repeatedly in the rest of the interview. The component of the public knowledge of crime obviously distinguishes the one of the other conception of crime. However, the consciousness of crime as such is apparently available in the case of both conceptions. Thus it seems that a particular feature of PR is the fear of regimes, that the public knowledge of crime could be bad for the preservation of their power. Accordingly, PR seems to be related to a public that did not yet constrict the brilliant figures of the old history.
- The term 'modern' receives from there a very particular importance with regard to the dealing (in Kohl's conception) of 'modern' governments with their realpolitik's possibly nasty results that are to be concealed before the public. This also explains why Kohl associates the component of the rascal in the direction of Goebbels who was not yet modern enough and got 'caught'.
- But then Kohl employs a great, linguistic gesture in the direction of Gorbachev. 'That is, ...', 'that was ...' are respective preludes for the following characterizations of the Soviet state chief. Gorbachev appears as an important figure which Kohl - so to speak 'honestly' - admires. In addition to 'modern', the characterizations of Gorbachev as 'communist' and as a 'leader' also show Kohl's grave statemanlike gesture (that definitely excludes any intended offence).
- In addition, "modern" corresponds with 'not liberal' ('I do not consider him to be a liberal"), with 'attractive', "Kalifornien", "Hollywood", "Paris" and with a 'beautiful dress'. Exept for 'not liberal' (a detail that so far appears somewhat puzzling), all other terms belong to the semantic field of 'the West' and signal 'high standard of living', 'consumption', or 'prestige', i.e. the standard experience of the (western) bourgeoisie.
- The adjective 'communist' must be seen as a differentiation to 'Soviet' or 'Russian'. 'Soviet' would feature Gorbachev rather as lagging behind and staring at a rigid bureaucracy. This would stress Gorbachev's proximity to its predecessors. 'Russian', in turn, would draw on the 'Russian people' and put into the foreground Gorbachev's origin and his affiliation and would have no special semantic value, particularly not in the impressive gesture of speech of this passage. In contrast, 'communist' associates a specific personal 'brilliance' and independence ('a modern communist leader'). Kohl therefore picks out the term, that emphasizes Gorbachev's individuality best.
- "Führer" ['leader'] alludes to archaic forms of government, to the ignorant nation. No doubt, one only speaks rarely of western 'leaders' unless at meetings of the heads of government ('the western leaders'). At least, one would not speak of 'the American leader'. The term follows closely the phrase of the 'Soviet leadership' and stresses the guidance of a whole nation according to the will of the leader, the leadership. This highlights Gorbachev's genuine importance as a statesman, too.
- This also confirms an analysis of the phrases "Das ist ..." ['That is'] ... and "der war ..." ['He was']. "Das ist ..." ['That is'] insists on definitive determination, in contradiction to other opinions ('that is not .... but that is ...'). "Der" ['He/that'] adds even more emphasis to this contradiction and, therefore, also specifies it. "Der" may be derived from diverse patterns, e.g. from 'I know him. I tell you, he ...'. This relates a strong impression, but also a warning, fear, and danger, here in particular in the direction to the interview partner. Kohl demonstrates perspicacity, his early recognition of a danger. Another derivation would also be possible: 'I know him. He is capably and ... '. Here Gorbachev's unpredictability and a violent temperament would predominate (cf. the cliche of Russian alcoholism, the Russian soul etc.), the moving in and punch through. This however would support the conception of the despot who does not need PR, the old Russia.
- With "modern", however, Kohl rather contrasts Gorbachev with this old type of his predecessors, which he no doubt would not have granted this trait. Therefore, Gorbachev must be a new type who is just 'refining' himself according to western standards or has already refined hinself. One may well presume that he would never follow the way of his predecessors but is someone to apply 'PR'.
- The sentences beginning in gesture so impressively with "Das ist ..." and "Der war ...", together with all other elements, enhancing Gorbachev's individuality, let the entire section (starting from "Das ist ...") almost appear as a plea. Kohl contradicts passionately, and outright protects Gorbachev against something. However, the impulse that goes out from "Goebbels" and that must disturb this positive comment (for the reader and his expectation) can not be meant negatively, because this impulse is linked to "Kalifornien"/Hollywood" (Reagan), at the same time. The appalling fact in this finding is due to the 'disregard' of crime as a necessary evil of 'great politics' which is also implied in Kohl's biologistic conception of history.
- In that, one could identify Kohl's 'realism', which he wants to bring home to Nagorski, the US American, taking Gorbachev as an example. As a teacher he wants to make clear: 'Look, Gorbachev is a great realist like me. He is not the simpleton, that some weaklings in the west want to make of him.' - To warn against Gorbachev makes sense only if this is clear.
- The German chancellor and the "fools"
- If Kohl's euphoria for "California" / "Hollywood" may strike as a bit artificial, the dramatic recognition of Gorbachev also appears somewhat put-on: Kohl just warns Reagan ("Hollywood"), the alleged master, against Gorbachev's tricks and at the same time poses as admirer of the one against whom he warns. Kohl has orchestrated this 'equidistance' so thoroughly in the entire printed interview (in which he, by the way, in one place condemns the position of 'equidistance' sharply), that it points automatically into the middle and to the one who subjects 'both parties' to his judgment - to the German chancellor.
- The 'just' measure of expert praise and reproach distributed by Kohl to both sides does not only create a power platform placed over these two sides (Kohl). But this platform is also defined by a criterion, to which Kohl does not only subject Reagan and Gorbachev but necessarily also himself: This criterion wears an unambiguous identification label - Goebbels - and is placed in a historical continuum, that apparently has now arrived at Kohl.
- Through his unmistakable hint at Goebbels, Kohl determines 'PR' as an instrument of the power politics of the west and - lately - the east. Kohl unmasks things frankly, wants to make clear, wants to 'convince' his counterpart, that the west, especially America operate with something, in the management of which - and this is the reason for Kohl's passionate effort - Gorbachev is obviously about to draw even.
- Understandably Kohl can therefore not run into the question of the legitimacy or reprehensibility of propaganda/PR. Of exclusive importance seems to be the tricky problem that Gorbachev now directs PR to a western public that is habitually used to succumb to PR's appropriate effects: Gorbachev is about to neutralize resistances to his realpolitik in the west even better than Reagan. The neutralization of counteracting forces in the emerging inner Soviet public is therefore completely put into the background: Kohl uses the term 'liberal', which is common to the western and particularly US-American practice of speech, but which here describes a possible effect of Gorbachev's foreign PR policy onto the western political spectrum. Kohl does not consider Gorbachev to be a 'liberal'.
- Because, therefore, the term 'liberal' applies neither historically, nor in respect to the domestic situation of the Soviet Union (as far as it is known in the west), i.e. not at all, it bears some additional ironic emphasis. The corresponding sentence might then be understood in the sense that 'this [Gorbachev] is anything else but a liberal'. In this ironic elucidation it becomes apparent that Kohl already at the beginning of the section was steering towards Goebbels as a destination of his argumentation. The association, that is implied in the ironic emphasis, namely 'to have quite a record' is already too clear in 'anything else', which then is realized in "Goebbels", the scoundrel. Therefore, it is obviously not true that Kohl's mentioning of Goebbels was only a spontaneous thought.
- 'Not liberal' is to be filled semantically with all those elements that Kohl via PR attaches to Gorbachev, since the sentence "I do not consider to be a liberal" completes the figure of speech, that further up was constituted. Accordingly, this figure reads: 'I do not consider him to be a liberal, but a modern, communist leader.' However, Kohl develops the term 'modern' by means of the keywords PR, Goebbels, "Kalifornien", "Hollywood" - as already shown. Thus it turns out that the positive signal 'modern' is exchangeable with 'not liberal'. Both terms are thought to bear a morally positive meaning. In this way, the evaluative key to the text is available, i.e. also the value, Kohl dissociates himself from: liberal. At the same time, it becomes clear that Kohl mentions Goebbels, because he considers him - alongside with Reagan and Gorbachev - to be part of his own historic camp of the 'great' leaders: the non-liberals.
- Now however, also Kohl's actual argument sent to Reagan, to Kohl's US-American counterpart, and to the western public becomes clearer: Kohl wants to preclude the opinion, the misunderstanding, that Gorbachev might not use PR in the 'usual' way, namely to veil necessary crimes of his realpolitik. Rather, he - so the fatal misunderstanding reads - might pursue in actual fact 'sincere' politics - while he just 'leads' the western public to believe this with the aid of PR. But Gorbachev, in fact, is not at all 'anything better than' Reagan, although Gorbachev's PR unfortunately meets a western public that seems to fall victim to the disguise. In contrast, Kohl is not such a 'fool'. However, others, 'journalists and politicians in the western world' are such fools, may be, Andrew Nagorski included.
- Folly can easily be defined as stupidity, naivety, credulity. Elements of a such an attitude would for instance be the 'childish belief', that power politics might be possible without hiding corpses in the stack or that there might be historical progress towards fewer crimes, or that - and this a consequence, too - the democratic form of government might change anything at the preconditions of realpolitik. Consequently, folly - in the sense applied here - would also be the idea, that the public might be able to influence the requirements of the necessary realpolitik (necessary for the 'survival' of great nations).
- Ironically enough, nothing of the sort would be dear enough for Kohl now, in the question of Gorbachev's PR, which apparently cannot be countered without the western public's insight into the laws of realpolitik. Unfortunately, this insight is not there - because of the natural laws of realpolitik, precluding the public's insight.
- "die Frau Gorbachev" [ 8 ]
- By help of an especially practical example Kohl finally wants to demonstrate the way Gorbachev's PR works and, on the other hand, to what extent 'fools' falls for it. In this case, it suffices to list briefly, which text elements could be subject of an analysis. These elements may be: "die Frau Gorbachev" (in the perception of the 'fools' a simple housewife and spouse, but in actual fact her husband's agent?), "eine attraktive Frau" ['an attractive woman'] (modern),"geht nach Paris" ['goes to Paris'] (instruction?), "ein schönes Kostüm" ['a beautiful dress'] (that is already enough for the PR effect - sign for delusion)
- Kohl's position is unambiguous. The dress purchase is a 'modern-communist' diversion maneuver, a perfectly devised PR measure, that makes use of the already established western patterns of reception, that anyhow recently rush towards Lady Di and Nancy Reagan or towards TV series, such as 'Dallas' and 'Denver'. This brilliantly simple trick by Gorbachev is already enough to daze the "fools" in the west and to convince them, that Gorbachev might be a 'liberal'. However - so Kohl's criminological expert opinion - this dress purchase has nothing to do with liberality, nothing with the refined western way of life - as the 'fools' think ("Das hat doch damit überhaupt nichts zu tun" ['That has nothing to do with it at all']). In contrast, the dress purchase of his wife in Paris stands for Gorbachev's 'true' intention to make the western public sleepy and compliant to the Soviet realpolitik.
- The line of Kohl's protest-like contradictions is now complete. "Ich bin kein Narr" ['I am not a fool'] - "Das hat doch damit überhaupt nichts zu tun" ['That has got nothing to do with it'] - "Man muss die Dinge doch auf den Punkt bringen" ['One must bring things to the point']. These redundant text elements need no depth analysis, either. These elements form 'bridges' which are meant to tie non-reflected segments together. They are cracks that Kohl bridges by the demonstration of 'commitment', involvement, indignation, and emotion. Since indignation can also be expressed excellently physically it should be considered which room for action this opens to Kohl.
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